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This paper examines the role of the coalition formation process in a proportional system. It models its 
impact on the voters (who maximize their expected utilities) and the parties (who choose their platforms 
in a Nash game). In contrast with the intuitive idea that proportional systems represent “proportionally”, 
I show that a proportional system with minimal range coalitions leads to party convergence towards the 
median of the political spectrum. Indeed, a political party’s prospects of power are better when it is more 
likely to find ideological partners, i.e. when it is not ideologically isolated. In contrast, if coalitions are 
formed according to a minimum winning coalition rule a la Riker, any policy can be implemented in 
equilibrium.  
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1. Introduction 
This paper examines the role of the coalition formation process in a proportional system. It 
models its impact on the behaviors of the voters and on the strategies of the parties. In its 
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prediction of policy outcomes, it confronts and contrasts two simple coalition settings: 
minimal range coalitions, where coalitions are thought to group political parties in terms of 
ideological proximity, and minimum size coalitions, where parties care more about theirs 
shares of the cake of power than about policy platforms per se. 
According to the former theory (minimal range theory, a special case of policy theory, 
Leiserson (1966) and Axelrod (1970)), a party wants to belong to a coalition whose ideal 
policy is as close as possible to its own ideology. It predicts that the winning coalition is the 
coalition reaching more than 50% whose ideological distance between the more different 
parties (i.e. whose range) is as small as possible.  
I show that minimal range coalitions lead to party convergence towards the median of the 
political spectrum. This median voter result is in sharp contrast with the commonsensical idea 
that proportional systems represent “proportionally”, i.e. that the major ideological groups 
are represented by ideologically diverse parties, indeed one of the main arguments in favour 
of this type of systems. 
To the contrary, I show that proportional systems can be used to guarantee moderate 
outcomes, but this at the expense of political diversity. The logic behind the result is as 
follows. Unless it does not need to form a coalition – meaning it can appeal to an absolute 
majority of voters, i.e. it occupies the median position – a political party’s power prospects 
are good only when it is likely to find ideological partners with whom to form an absolute 
majority, i.e. when it is not ideologically isolated. 
The key to the result lies not in proportionality in itself but in the coalition rule and the 
incentives it gives to the parties. It is in anticipation to the way the winning coalition is going 
to emerge in the different ideological party configurations that the parties all end up picking 
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the middle-of-the-road policy. An isolated party wants either to move to the center to obtain 
an absolute majority or move closer to another party to form a winning coalition with it after 
the election.  
Indeed, if coalitions are formed according to a different rule, convergence to the median is 
not guaranteed. I show that many configurations and policy outcomes are possible in a 
minimum winning coalition rule a la Riker. This rule was developed with size theory (Von 
Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) and Riker (1962)). It asserts that parties want to have a 
maximal influence in the decision making and therefore want to team with a party whose 
score is as small as possible. In that case, there is no special advantage to being gregarious 
and focal parties can win even if extremist as in other electoral systems. 
These results are striking, both in their contrast to each other and in their contrast to 
common wisdom. They also fit with moderation observed in many countries with 
proportional systems. As closed minimal range theory is empirically the most satisfying of all 
existing theories in this field and is in line with recent emphasis on the partisan behavior of 
parties (see Alesina and Rosenthal (1995)), the median voter result seems especially 
appealing.1 
I believe that the set-up in which I obtain these results is both quite general and convincing.  
The model mainly uses a geometric interpretation of Myerson and Weber (1993). The 
general technical model can be found in a companion paper. Here we adapt it specifically to 
proportional systems. Here are the key assumptions. 
The set of parties is given and their ideologies are endogenous. They choose their platforms 
in a Nash game. Voters are rational even if unable to directly interact with each other. They 
care for the policy outcomes, not for candidates in themselves, and therefore vote by taking 
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into account the relative probabilities of being pivotal between outcomes. Which outcomes 
are possible and which outcomes can compete against each other for victory depend on the 
rule of coalition building.2 Geometric analysis shows what pivot probabilities make sense. 
The relative weights of these probabilities are given exogeneously by social perceptions, 
forming common beliefs.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an informal model for a 
proportional system with minimal range coalition and its concept of positional equilibrium. 
Section 3 derives results a median voter result. Section 4 considers minimal winning 
coalitions and derives a very different result. Section 5 concludes and discusses related 
literature. 
  
2. The Set-Up  
The political space is a one-dimensional [0, 100] segment. The electorate’s bliss points are 
uniformly and discretely distributed on {0, 1, ... 100}. Voters vote for one party. There are 
three parties, who choose their positions in order to maximize their chances of winning the 
election. 
The utility for a voter at position t if policy xi is implemented takes the usual quadratic form: 
ui(t) = - (xi - t)2. 
 
In a purely proportional system, representation of the parties in the Parliament is 
proportional to their scores in the election. We assume no minimum threshold of 
representation.  
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Institutional assumption: in order for a policy to be implemented, it must be approved by 
an absolute majority of votes in the Assembly.  
A proportional system is an electoral system in which a party forms a government alone if it 
gets more than half of the votes. If no party passes the critical score of 50%, a coalition of 
parties whose scores sum to more than 50% forms a government.  
As there are three parties, if no party gets more than half of the votes, any coalition of two 
parties is a winning coalition (as the complement of the third party, which has less than 
50%). To find out which coalition will be in power and which policy will be implemented, 
we must make assumptions on the process of coalition formation and on the position of a 
coalition3. 
This section considers a proportional system with ideological coalitions: the two parties 
whose ideologies are the closest form the winning coalition. 
Regarding the policy positioning of the coalition, we assume that the coalition policy will be 
at the middle of the positions of the two winning parties, regardless of their respective 
scores4. 
The voter does not only take her preferences into account when voting, but also beliefs 
about the serious races for victory in order not to waste her vote. Pivot-probability pij is the 
probability that outcomes i and j may be in a sufficiently close race for first place that her 
ballot alone could swing the election from one to the other. The pis are common beliefs 
formed via the pre-election polls (their exact formation process is exogenous). Pivot-
probabilities are normalized so as to sum up to 1. 
What are the relevant pivot-probabilities in this setting? The probability that parties 1 and 2 
be in contention for first place, p12, is not an appropriate concept: the question is not to 
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know which party comes first, but whether any party will be strong enough to obtain an 
absolute majority or whether there will be a minimal range coalition. 
An example of an appropriate pivot probability regards the race between party 1 reaching 
50% and winning alone and a coalition government, leading to the minimal range coalition. 
Possible races are thus not between parties, but between outcomes. Here there are four 
possible outcomes: 1 wins alone (outcome 1), 2 wins alone (outcome 2), 3 wins alone 
(outcome 3), and the coalition of the ideologically closest two parties wins (mrc for minimal 
range coalition). 
This can be seen geometrically by noticing that the percentage scores of the candidates sum 
up to one. If Si denotes the percentage score of party i, then S1 + S2 + S3 = 100%: the set 
of all possible results is a two-dimensional simplex.  
In a proportional system with ideological coalitions, for any positioning of the candidates, 
there are four outcome zones, as illustrated in figure 1.  
  S2
               (0,1,0)
   2
 
           (0,0.5,0.5)                (0.5,0.5,0)
            Coalition of
           minimal
                 3         range        1
S1
      (0,0,1)                  (0.5,0,0.5)                   (1,0,0)
 
Figure 1: The outcome simplex when coalitions are of minimal range 
The winning coalition includes the closest two parties. 
 
What outcomes can be in close races for implementation? As just explained, p1,mrc should be 
considered. We exclude p12, as both parties being in contention for 50% is not possible 
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unless party 3 gets no vote at all. The three possibly positive pivot-probabilities will be 
p1,mrc, p2,mrc and p3,mrc. 
How do these pivot-probabilities influence the strategic behavior of the voters? Consider for 
example p1,mrc with other pivot-probabilities negligible. Voters preferring outcome 1 to the 
minimal range coalition naturally vote for 1, while all others, in the hope to prevent 1 from 
reaching 50%, vote for either 2 or 3. 
How do these pivot-probabilities vary?  First, if a party moves, it can change the way it is 
perceived as a serious contender, exactly as in Myerson and Weber. But in this electoral 
system, a change of positioning can also change the structure of the pivot-probabilities 
themselves. Assume parties 1 and 2 are close ideologically, with 3 very far away. The 
minimal range coalition is the coalition including 1 and 2. Now if 3 moves very close to party 
2, then 2 and 3 form the minimal range coalition.  
 
    S2   
                (0,1,0)                
  
             2 wins 
      
        (0,0.5,0.5)                                                   (0.5,0.5,0) 
  
               1 + 2  
             3 wins            1 wins 
     S1 
      (0,0,1)                   (0.5,0,0.5)                    (1,0,0)  
    S2   
                (0,1,0)               
   
               2 wins  
      
        (0,0.5,0.5)                         (0.5,0.5,0) 
  
               2 + 3  
             3 wins            1 wins 
     S1 
      (0,0,1)                   (0.5,0,0.5)                    (1,0,0)        
 p1,1+2 + p2,1+2 + p3,1+2 = 1                  p1,2+3 + p2,2+3
  + p3,2+3 = 1  
     x1 = 10, x2 = 30, x3 = 60   x1 = 10, x2 = 30, x3 = 23 
Figure 2: Example of how a party (here party 3) can change the belief structure by moving 
 
Using her preferences and beliefs, each voter can compute her expected gain for voting for 
each party. 
 
Voters’ behaviors:  
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1°) each t-type voter casts a ballot for a candidate maximizing her expected gain, 
2°) in case of a tie he randomizes with a fair coin. 
Let us insist on the fact that voters are not really playing a game, as the expected gains do 
not depend on the individual behaviors of the other voters (and does not even require them 
to know the voters’ distribution). 
The behavior of the voters then determines the expected scores of the parties and their 
probabilities of being in power (alone or with another candidate). These probabilities are 
endogenous and should not be confused with the exogenous pivot-probabilities. 
Let us examine the strategies and actions of the parties. A party’s only strategic choice is the 
position it chooses. Its choice depends on the positions of the other parties and on the state 
of beliefs. We assume the parties play a Nash game. 
We also assume that being in power is a cake of size one, shared equally by the winning 
candidates. Thus if Ui denotes utility of party i, then U1 + U2 + U3 = 1.   
A situation is a positional equilibrium if there exists a state of beliefs function such that 
1°) the voters vote for the party maximizing their expected gains; 
2°) the positioning of the parties is a Nash equilibrium. 
Note that our definition of positional equilibrium is very weak in the sense that we assume no 
further restriction on the pivot-probabilities. Myerson and Weber demand that beliefs be in 
accordance with the outcome they imply and introduce the so-called ordering condition. 
We don’t impose any such (adapted) ordering condition. Our results are robust to it. 
We do not impose either any restriction that would link beliefs across positions: as in 
Myerson and Weber, independent sets of pivot-probabilities are associated to each 
positioning vector by the three parties. A candidate, considered as a very serious contender 
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under some positioning, might become a sure loser if she, or another candidate, moves by a 
tiny amount.5  
We made the choice to be as permissive as possible, since our concept is sufficient to really 
discriminate across voting systems, as the next two sections will show. 
 
3. A Median Voter Result with Ideological Coalitions 
 
Proposition 1: Under ideological coalitions, the only positional equilibrium shows 
total convergence of the parties at the median position. 
 
Lemma: Assume x1 = x2 ¹ x3. Then U1 = 1/2 = U2 if d(x1, 50) £ d(x3,50) and U3 = 1 if 
d(x1, 50) > d(x3,50). 
Proof of lemma: The only relevant pivot probability is p1+2,3, since 1, 2 and a coalition of 1 
and 2 lead to the same outcome. Therefore any voter’s expected gains for voting for 1 or 2 
are equal: EG(2) = EG(1) to be compared to EG(3). Voters who prefer policy x1 randomize 
between 1 and 2, voters who prefer x3 vote for 3; Equidistant voters randomize between the 
three parties. 
 
Proof of proposition 1: 
Let us show that A) any situation without total convergence of the three parties is not an 
equilibrium, B) a situation where x1= x2 = x3 ¹ 50 is not an equilibrium and C) a situation 
where x1= x2 = x3 = 50 is an equilibrium. 
A) Consider any situation where x1 £ x2 £ x3 with at least x1 < x3. 
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U2 < ½ is not possible in equilibrium since 2 could deviate and obtain U2 = ½ by the lemma. 
Therefore U2 ³ ½, implying that U1 + U3 £ ½ and therefore U1 £ ¼ or U3 £ ¼. This is not 
possible in equilibrium since either 1 or 2 would deviate and insure utility of at least 1/3. 
B) Assume x1= x2 = x3 ¹ 50. 
Then U1 = U2 = U3 = 1/3. Any party deviating to 50 would get utility 1 by lemma.   
C) Assume x1= x2 = x3 = 50. 
Then U1 = U2 = U3 = 1/3. Any party deviating would get utility 0 by lemma.    
 
The idea of the proposition is that an isolated extremist party cannot win the election while 
by joining the most centrist party it would belong to a minimal range coalition. The minimal 
range coalition is always a serious contender. As the most extreme two parties cannot win 
simultaneously, in equilibrium no party will be more extremist than the others. Thus, they 
finally all hold the same position at 50. 
This median voter result is important, as minimal range theory is empirically the best theory 
of coalition formation. Note that it is robust to coalitions being simply connected (rather than 
necessarily of minimal range) and as long as the position of a coalition is anywhere strictly 
between the positions of the parties (rather than exactly at the middle).6 
Proposition 1 is quite intuitive and quite close to the reality of countries where 
proportionality is applied. Germany fits very well the assumptions and the results. Belgium is 
another good example with three major centrist parties.  
We did not impose any restrictions on the pivot-probabilities. Despite this, beliefs appear to 
be powerless in this system: they cannot exclude a party from the race if it is not 
ideologically isolated. Indeed, the set of pivot-probabilities that should be considered is 
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restricted endogenously by the rule of coalition formation.  And a world with ideological 
coalitions disadvantages lonely extreme candidates. 
In the next section, we consider a proportional system when coalitions are formed according 
to size theory and obtain a strikingly different result. 
 
4. A Proportional System with Minimum Size Coalitions 
In a proportional system with coalition of the smallest two parties there are six outcome 
zones: the coalition zone is split in three zones as shown in the following figure.  
 
  S2
               (0,1,0)
2 wins
 
           (0,0.5,0.5)                (0.5,0.5,0)
   
1 + 3
            1 + 2   2 + 3
             3 wins                  1 wins
S1
      (0,0,1)                  (0.5,0,0.5)                   (1,0,0)
 
Figure 3: The outcome simplex according to size theory 
   
The zone where a party wins alone is adjacent with the zone where the other two parties 
share the power. The possibly positive pivot-probabilities are of the form pi,j+k or pi+j,i+k 
where i,j,k represent different parties.7 
 
Proposition 2: If the winning coalition is the minimum size one, then in equilibrium, 
the winning policy can be anywhere strictly between 0 and 100. 8 
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Proof of proposition 2: 
By symmetry, it is sufficient to show that the winning policy can be anywhere between 1 and 
50. We consider a situation where x1 is anywhere between 1 and 50 and both 2 and 3 are 
positioned at 100 - x1/2. Consider any state of beliefs such that  
p1,2+3(x1, 100 - x1/2, 100 - x1/2) = 1  (A1) 
p1+3,2+3(x1, 50 - x1/4, 100 - x1/2) = 1 (A2) 
p1+2,2+3(x1, 100 - x1/2, 50 - x1/4) = 1 (A3) 
p2+3,2+1(x1, s, 100 - x1/2) = 1 for any s ¹ 100 - x1/2 and s ¹ 50 - x1/4 (A4) 
p3+1,3+2(x1, 100 - x1/2, s) = 1 for any s ¹ 100 - x1/2 and s ¹ 50 - x1/4 (A5) 
In such a situation, by (A1), a majority of voters prefer 1 to a coalition of 2 and 3 and cast a 
ballot for 1. The outcome of the election is x1. 
Party 2 is dissuaded from moving to 50 - x1/4 because 1 would win by beliefs (A2), or 
anywhere else because 1 or 3 would win by (A4). 
Symmetrically, 3 is dissuaded from moving by (A3) and (A5). 
ð 
If the winning coalition is of minimal size, the nature of the appropriate pivot-probabilities 
does not depend on the positions of the parties. Therefore and contrarily to the ideological 
coalition case, beliefs do not in essence favor moderate parties. Beliefs are able to support 
any party and make it win. 
The contrast between propositions 1 and 2 shows that the process of coalition formation in 
proportional systems is crucial when trying to predict the outcome of such systems. 
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6. Discussion 
This paper adapts Myerson and Weber’s model to study proportional systems with three 
parties. The overall results can be summarized as follows. The moderation capacity of a 
proportional system strongly depends on the coalition formation rules. Convergence to the 
median is achieved if coalitions are formed according to minimal range theory while multiple 
equilibria exist if coalitions are formed according to size theory.  
These results should be compared to Austen-Smith and Banks (1988) who proposed the 
first formalization of a proportional system where both voters and candidates are strategic. 
A party’s utility is defined by a combination of its share of power and the distance between 
its platform and the eventual outcome. A non-cooperative game describes the coalition 
formation process: first the biggest party can make a coalition proposal (including a division 
of the pie of power) to a party. If the party refuses, the second biggest party makes an offer 
and eventually the smallest.  
The authors isolate one specific equilibrium where two major parties position symmetrically 
with respect to a small median party. Each of them makes with probability ½ a coalition 
proposal to the small centrist party so as to have it accept it. This equilibrium is sustained by 
a very specific assumption regarding the out-of-equilibrium rational expectations: the voting 
equilibrium anticipated if one of the two major parties moves is making this party worse off. 
The coalition formation game chosen by Austen-Smith and Banks is therefore close to our 
minimal winning coalition model where extreme outcome equilibria can be sustained by 
explicit states of beliefs.  
Our geometric framework could formalize their game, as well as alternative coalition 
formation rules, by integrating its coalition formation equilibria into the outcome simplex. 
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In a two-dimensional space, Baron (1993) also obtains equilibria where the parties do not 
converge to the center. We are unaware of any paper predicting full convergence. 
Our results show the crucial importance of the coalition formation rule in predicting 
outcomes of proportional systems. They should encourage the already very active research 
on coalition formation, at both the empirical and theoretical levels.  
The present paper was in fact an informal adaptation of Myerson and Weber (1993). 
Their multiple equilibrium result in a plurality election inspired our proposition 2 directly.  
Myerson and Weber’s multiple equilibria result in a plurality election is easily interpreted in 
relative majority election where there are three parties: the largest party, whatever its score, 
even if it is lower than half of the total of the votes, gets the power.9 In a companion paper 
we show that in a runoff system too, any policy can be sustained in equilibrium.  
We therefore propose a striking comparative result: contrarily to majority systems, a 
proportional system can drive the parties toward moderation. This result seems in line with 
empirical reality in Europe, where coalition governments in countries like Belgium, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, seem indeed to propose more moderate policies than the 
parties in France or the United Kingdom (at least before the New Labour). 
 
Endnotes: 
1, This should be linked with the analysis by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) on “moderating 
elections”: in electoral systems with two polarized parties, moderate voters are able to vote 
strategically for their less preferred party in one assembly so as to moderate the overall 
policy. 
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2, Recently, the process of coalition formation in a legislature has been examined within a 
non cooperative sequential game framework, mainly by Baron. Parties are sequentially 
selected to make a coalition proposal to the others with some given probabilities (which may 
depend on their sizes). These papers show that the resulting coalitions depend strongly on 
the game and on whether or not a default outcome exists at some point. These models have 
not yet been tested empirically. 
3, This means that when modeling a proportional system in what follows, we in fact model a 
proportional system and a government coalition process. 
4, We thus implicitly assume that the parties have the same bargaining power (note that they 
all share a common Shapley-Shubik power index of 1/3). This assumption is not crucial. 
5, Note that, in general, “out of equilibrium” pivot-probabilities are not negligible. Indeed, 
when optimally choosing its position, each party takes the positions of the other parties as 
given and computes the probability of being in power in each possible situation, which 
depends on the pivot-probabilities for each of his positions. 
6, This means for example that a median voter result is obtained if the largest party is always 
in the winning coalition and chooses to form a coalition with the closer party. Or if the 
median party has all the bargaining power and forms a winning coalition with the smaller of 
the other two. 
7, Note a funny thing about expected gains here: influencing the outcome in the direction of 
i+j means making the majority of i+j smaller than the majority of i+k, as the winning coalition 
is the smaller one. 
8, The case of a proportional system with maximum size coalition would lead to similar 
results. 
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9, Myerson and Weber find a median voter theorem under approval voting.  In such a 
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1 This should be linked with the analysis by Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) on “moderating elections”: in 
electoral systems with two polarized parties, moderate voters are able to vote strategically for their less 
preferred party in one assembly so as to moderate the overall policy. 
 
2 Recently, the process of coalition formation in a legislature has been examined within a non 
cooperative sequential game framework, mainly by Baron. Parties are sequentially selected to make a 
coalition proposal to the others with some given probabilities (which may depend on their sizes). These 
papers show that the resulting coalitions depend strongly on the game and on whether or not a default 
outcome exists at some point. These models have not yet been tested empirically. 
3 This means that when modeling a proportional system in what follows, we in fact model a proportional 
system and a government coalition process. 
4 We thus implicitly assume that the parties have the same bargaining power (note that they all share a 
common Shapley-Shubik power index of 1/3). This assumption is not crucial. 
5 Note that, in general, “out of equilibrium” pivot-probabilities are not negligible. Indeed, when optimally 
choosing its position, each party takes the positions of the other parties as given and computes the 
probability of being in power in each possible situation, which depends on the pivot-probabilities for 
each of his positions. 
6 This means for example that a median voter result is obtained if the largest party is always in the 
winning coalition and chooses to form a coalition with the closer party. Or if the median party has all the 
bargaining power and forms a winning coalition with the smaller of the other two. 
7 Note a funny thing about expected gains here: influencing the outcome in the direction of i+j means 
making the majority of i+j smaller than the majority of i+k, as the winning coalition is the smaller one. 
8 The case of a proportional system with maximum size coalition would lead to similar results. 
9 Myerson and Weber find a median voter theorem under approval voting.  In such a system, the 
coordination problem is solved by the possibility to cast a ballot for several candidates. 
 
 
 
